Economic Sanctions and Export Controls by McGlone, William M. & Trenkle, Timothy P.
Economic Sanctions and Export Controls
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I. Introduction
Changes to U.S. export controls and economic sanctions were driven by two competing,
diametrically opposed, trends in 1998. On the one hand, we heard heightened calls for limiting
export controls and sanctions, particularly unilateral measures or those with a broad extraterrito-
rial reach. On the other hand, we saw a continuing proliferation of new sanctions programs
and frenzied pleas for more. restrictive export controls. This policy tug-of-war served as a
reminder that these complex legal regimes are constantly shaped by domestic political forces,
as well as the foreign policy, national security, and nonproliferation concerns that they are
designed to address. Despite growing calls for reform and retrenchment, recent experience
suggests that export controls and economic sanctions are likely to remain fixtures of American
diplomacy and security policy for years to come.
While we have made every effort to identify major changes to these ever-evolving legal
regimes, the issues identified below are by no means exhaustive. The political and policy debates
that drove changes to U.S. export controls and sanctions regimes in 1998 are, in large measure,
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we focus on the end result-namely, statutory and
regulatory developments that impose new or different compliance obligations on U.S. persons
and companies engaging in international business activities. Consistent with similar surveys in
prior issues, we focus below on changes to (1) the Commerce Department's Export Administra-
tion Regulations; (2) the State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and
(3) trade and economic sanctions administered primarily by the Treasury Department's Office
of Foreign Assets Control. All of these regulatory programs have been created and modified-
over many years-through a combination of legislative and executive action. As a result of
this shared parentage, which is not always cooperative, the policy direction of these regimes
often breeds tension or even open conflict between the U.S. Congress and the White House.
Given the overlapping nature of various export controls and sanctions measures, it is difficult
and somewhat artificial to organize them in a coherent fashion. As suggested above, these
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regulatory regimes are typically based on multiple layers of legislative and executive pronounce-
ments, and they often bear the scars of interagency wrangling even within the Executive Branch.
In this sense, 1998 was no different from prior years. Many of the developments discussed
below, particularly sanctions measures, were implemented by several government agencies, in
a number of different regulatory programs, acting under various statutory authorities. Despite
their hybrid nature, however, we have divided these developments into two general categories:
(1) sanctions, which tend to be directed at particular countries or groups, and (2) export controls,
which generally apply to a broader range of transactions based on the nature of the products
or technology being shipped.
11. Sanctions: New and Evolving Programs
In 1998, the federal government created a number of new sanctions programs, issued imple-
menting regulations for others already in place, and made modifications to certain long-standing
regimes.
A. MEASURS TARGETING SPECIC COUNIES
1. India and Pakistan
In response to a series of nudear weapons tests by India and then Pakistan in May, President
Clinton imposed statutorily-mandated sanctions under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act of 1994 (NPPA), otherwise known as the Glenn Amendment. The Glenn Amendment,
a provision in the Arms Export Control Act that previously caught little attention, mandates
a menu of sanctions against any "non-nudear" state that "detonate[s] a nuclear explosive
device."' Ambiguities in the statute generated considerable confusion-both within government
and the business community-about the exact nature and scope of the sanctions to be imposed.
At the same time, the unilateral and rigid nature of the sanctions caused both the Clinton
Administration and the Congress to look for ways to make these sanctions more flexible and,
more generally, to reconsider how future legislative sanctions measures should be drafted and
implemented.
The first step under the Glenn Amendment was simple and swift. Almost immediately
following India's surprise nuclear tests, President Clinton issued a determination that India had
"detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11, 1998," and he directed the relevant govern-
ment agencies to impose sanctions under the NPPA.2 The President issued a similar determina-
tion with respect to Pakistan shortly after its detonation of a nuclear device on May 28, 1998.'
a. Dual-Use Exports
Implementation of the sanctions, however, was no easy matter. Turning to the broad list
of penalty measures required under the NPPA, the Administration struggled to figure out what
a number of the provisions actually meant. One of the export-related measures, for example,
required the "authorities of section 2405 of tide 50 ... shall be used to prohibit exports to
[the targeted country] of specific goods and technology." 4 This provision raised more questions
than answers, particularly since the Export Administration Act (EAR) had not even been in
I. Nudear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1994).
2. See Presdentisl Determination No. 98-22, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,665 (1998).
3 See Presidential Determination No. 98-25, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,881 (1998).
4. 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(bX2XG) (1994).
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effect since 1994.' Based on previous experience, some practitioners expected the government
to interpret this provision narrowly to require the denial of all new ficense requests for goods
and technology that were already subject to license requirements for export to India." At the
same time, the Commerce Department was under considerable pressure from other agencies-
most notably the State Department-to impose a virtual export embargo against India. With
little guidance from the plain meaning of the statute, this issue took many months to resolve.
On June 18, the Commerce Department announced a licensing policy of denial for exports
and reexports of items controlled for nudear nonproliferation and missile technology reasons
to India and Pakistan, with limited exceptions.7 In addition, the announcement indicated that
the Department would soon publish a list of entities in both countries for which export license
requirements would be expanded. More than six months later, on November 19, 1998, the
Commerce Department issued the long-awaited list of entities in India and Pakistan that are
now subject to strict export sanctions.' The new list added more than two hundred government,
parastatal, and private entities to the Commerce Department's "Entity List," set forth in part
744 of the EAR. Exports and reexports to the designated entities are now subject to license
requirements and, in most cases, a policy of export denial. This list filled a legal and policy
void that had existed since the Glenn Amendment sanctions were first announced in May.
The new EAR export restrictions are curious in a number of respects. First, it is by no
means dear that they were mandated by the Glenn Amendment. On the contrary, they arguably
go beyond the scope of what was required by the ambiguous provision cited above. Indeed,
the Commerce Department has indicated that these nonproliferation controls, which reach a
broad range of commercial entities in India, were intended as a compromise between more
limited restrictions and a total export embargo that was pushed for by the State Department.
In any event, these sanctions are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future, even
though certain other Glenn Amendment sanctions were lifted even before these were imposed.
The EAR controls also take the unusual step of creating a favorable licensing policy for
exporters that can establish a history of business dealings with certain sanctioned entities. This
policy strikes some practitioners as a bit odd, given that it appears to reward those companies
that have been dealing with these entities of proliferation concern, while effectively penalizing
companies that have conducted little or no business with them. In a similar vein, the new
regulation induded a thirty-day savings dause for goods that were already "in-transit" when
the regulation was published on November 19. This undoubtedly benefitted companies that
had continued to conduct business as usual, notwithstanding the June 18 warning that a sanc-
tioned entities list was imminent. At the same time, companies that had shown restraint while
5. The EAA lapsed in 1994 and has remained dormant ever since. In the absence of EAA renewal legislation,
the President has extended the Commerce Department's export control regulations under the statutory authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
6. Such an approach would have been consistent with the Commerce Department's interpretation of a
similar provision in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Star. 2571
(1992). Under that law, Commerce took the position that a provision baring exports of "items subject to control
under section 5 or 6" of the EAA applied only to items that were already subject to an export license requirement
for export to Iran or Iraq. While those two countries were, of course, subject to far broader trade restrictions,
the Irn-lraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act was not used as the basis for imposing additional export licensing
requirements.
7. This licensing policy was never published in the Federal Register or the EAR. Instead, it was posted on
the Commerce Department's web site. If it continues, this practice of "alerting" the business community only
through unofficial means could raise due process and rule of law questions.
8. See 63 Fed. Reg. 64,322 (1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 742, 744).
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the regulations were being promised for months-and held up shipments to India-could not
take advantage of the savings clause.
b. Munitions List Controls
A second export restriction, more dear on its face, was implemented by the State Department's
Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) only one week after the presidential declaration.
On May 20, 1998, ODTC amended its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to
impose a policy of denial for any new requests to export Munitions List items to India.! In
addition, ODTC announced that all outstanding ITAR licenses and approved agreements involv-
ing transfers to India were suspended.'0 ODTC implemented a similar policy with respect to
Pakistan, shortly after Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests."
c. Financial Sanctions
The Glenn Amendment also included a number of far-reaching financial sanctions, including
a restriction on lending by U.S. banks which created considerable confusion. One prohibition-
the denial of any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by the U.S. government-
made both sanctioned countries ineligible for new programs or assistance offered by the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade and Development
Agency, and the Agency for International Development."2 Other sanctions mandated under
the statute included termination of all foreign military financing to India and Pakistan. 3 As
noted above, the most confusing and controversial financial sanction was the prohibition against
the extension of loans or other credit by U.S. banks to the Indian government. For months
following the announcement of sanctions, the Administration and the banking community
struggled to figure out how to implement these restrictions-which agency would implement
them; did the term "loan or extension of credit" include letters of credit and other banking
activities in support of commercial transactions; would the prohibition extend to entities owned
or controlled by the government of India or Pakistan? With the exception of the prohibition
against lending by U.S. banks to the government of India (which was never implemented), all
of these financial sanctions were imposed in the spring and later lifted by presidential waiver
as authorized by new legislation."
d. Efforts to Scale Back
While the Administration struggled to implement the mandatory sanctions, Congress took
two legislative steps to lessen the impact of the sanctions and to provide greater flexibility to
the Administration. In July, faced with the prospect of losing millions of dollars in wheat sales,
Congress passed a law that effectively excepted U.S. agriculture credit guarantees from the
sanctions." The President signed the bill only one day before U.S. exporters were able to bid
on a major Pakistani wheat purchase. He argued that the waiver legislation "ensure[d] that
9. See 63 Fed. Reg. 27,781 (1998). The revocation was effective as of May 13, 1998.
10. Seid.
11. See 63 Fed. Reg. 33,122 (1998). This revocation also took effect retroactively, on May 30, 1998.
12. Se 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(bX2XA) (1994).
13. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(bX2XQ (1994).
14. See infa note 17 and accompanying text.
15. Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-194, 112 Stat. 627.
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U.S. wheat and other products will not be the unintended victims of an important nonprolifera-
tion law.'
16
Congress also enacted a broader bill, the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998," which gave
the President the option of waiving a number of the sanctions imposed against India and
Pakistan. (This step reflected concerns about the rigid and permanent nature of the mandated
sanctions, as well as complaints from the Administration that it lacked the necessary diplomatic
flexibility to manage the crisis or provide incentives to the targeted governments to change
their behavior.) In exercising this authority on December 1, 1998, President Clinton restored
the Eximbank, OPIC, and TDA programs with respect to India and Pakistan, and avoided
having to impose the restrictions on the activities of U.S. banks.'"
2. Yugoslavia
In June, responding to Serbia's continued repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, President
Clinton issued an executive order blocking property of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and prohibiting new
investment in Serbia. 9 The June executive order was intended to parallel the European Union's
decision to impose a similar investment ban and asset freeze on Yugoslavia.
On October 13, 1998, these multilateral sanctions were implemented-in the form of regula-
tions-by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 20 While these
sanctions do not impose a trade embargo, they make it extremely difficult to effect payment
in connection with lawful trade transactions. Exports of goods to the targeted governments
or government entities2 are permitted under a regulatory exception, but only if payments are
made in accordance with the form of payment restrictions set forth in section 586.513(a)
(payment within thirty days in bank notes, currency of any kind, or barter).22 These payment
limitations, which OFAC officials say also bar payments through any Serbian bank, have made
it virtually impossible for U.S. companies to conduct business in Serbia, even for permitted
trade transactions or dealings with private entities that are not caught by the blocking order.
3. Burma
In May of 1998, OFAC issued its long-awaited regulations implementing the ban on new
investment in Burma. 2' Almost exactly one year earlier, President Clinton had issued an executive
order imposing the new investment ban, but certain key terms remained to be defined.24 The
President's action was taken under the so-called "Cohen-Feinstein Amendment," adopted by
Congress in response to the Burmese government's repressive policies. 2 Consistent with the
16. Statement by the President (visited Jan. 6, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12Rum:
pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1998/7/15/11.text.1 >.
17. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Star. 2681 at 48 (1998). Referred to as the "Brownback waiver authority".
18. Presidential Determination No. 99-7 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) < http://pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12Rum:
pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1998/12/2/7.text.1 >.
19. Executive Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (1998).
20. See 63 Fed. Reg. 54,575 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 586).
21. As defined in the Executive Order and the Regulations, the term "Government of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia" is defined broadly to include any entity or organization that is owned or effectively controlled
by the government. See 63 Fed. Reg. 32,110 (1998); 31 C.F.R. § 586.306 (1999).
22. 31 C.F.R. § 586.513 (1999).
23. 63 Fed. Reg. 27,846 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 537).
24. Executive Order No. 13,047, May 20, 1997, availabk in 1997 WL 272472.
25. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-121, 3009-166.
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statute, OFAC's investment ban applies to all "U.S. persons." U.S. persons are defined to
include U.S. citizens, residents, and companies organized under the laws of the United States-
induding their foreign branches. Although foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies are not directly
covered, a prohibition barring U.S. persons from approving or facilitating any new investment
by non-U.S. persons could implicate the U.S. parent of any foreign subsidiary making new
investments in Burma. Also consistent with the statute, the term "new investment" is defined
broadly to include virtually any transaction or contractual commitment involving the economic
development of resources in Burma. The executive order and the regulations define "resources"
to include "natural, agricultural, commercial, financial, industrial, and human resources" located
within Burma. "New investment" does not include the entry into, performance of, or financing
of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology.2
Although Burma is a significant market for relativdy few U.S. companies, the sanctions
illustrate the continuing propensity of the United States to use trade and economic sanctions
as instruments of foreign policy. Moreover, like recent sanctions measures against Iran, Libya,
and Sudan, the new investment prohibition is a unilateral U.S. initiative, without any comparable
multilateral restrictions.
4. Sudan
OnJuly 1, 1998, nearly eight months after sanctions against Sudan were imposed by executive
order, OFAC issued regulations implementing those sanctions.27 Consistent with the executive
order, the regulations blocked all Sudanese government assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction and
prohibited virtually all trade and investment transactions between the United States and Sudan.
Like most recent sanctions programs, these restrictions do not apply directly to the activities
of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, but they strictly prohibit any U.S. person or parent
company from "approving or facilitating" otherwise permitted third country trade with Sudan.
Perhaps the most newsworthy feature of OFAC's Sudan sanctions is that they offer OFAC's
first regulatory guidance on the meaning of facilitation. Section 5 38.407 defines "facilitation"
as "any action ... that assists or supports trading activity with Sudan by any person." This
includes financing a trade, insuring trade, or warranting the quality of goods sold by a subsidiary
to the Government of Sudan. 28 The regulations confirm, however, that certain passive activities
(such as reviewing reports of a foreign affiliate's business in Sudan) are not prohibited. These
definitions are consistent with OFAC's established practice under other sanctions programs,
but this is the first time they have been articulated in regulations. While they may help to
interpret parallel prohibitions against approval or facilitation in other sanctions regimes, OFAC
takes the position that each regulatory program is different, even to the point where similar
language can have different meaning.
In addition to the new regulatory program, Congress attempted to codify the ban on imports
from Sudan as part of the Religious Persecution Act. 9 This effort failed, however, in the House
Ways and Means Committee because of committee jurisdiction concerns, as well as broader
opposition to the imposition of additional unilateral sanctions.30
26. See 31 C.F.R. § 537.314(1999) ("U.S. person"); 31 C.F.R. § 537.308 (1999) ("new investment"); 31
C.F.R. § 537.311 (1999) ("resources"); 31 C.F.R. 5 37.204 (1999) ("exempt transactions").
27. See 63 Fed. Reg. 35,809 (1998) (to be codified at)31 C.F.R. pt. 538).
28. 63 Fed. Reg. 35,815 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 538.407).
29. Ways and Means Strika Sudan Impon Ban fimn Religiu Pfrsaution Bill, 16 INSME U.S. TRAEn, May
8, 1998, at 28.
30. Id.
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5. Iran
The Clinton Administration made several changes to the Iran sanctions regime during 1998.
Although it would be a stretch to characterize them as liberalizations, the White House did
take a number of steps that limited the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions and prevented
a possible expansion of existing sanctions.
a. Reduced Reporting
On November 10, OFAC trimmed back a regulatory provision requiring foreign affiliates of
U.S. companies to report certain oil-related transactions in Iran, including transactions involving
petrochemicals and oifield supplies, equipment, and services."' Although the U.S. sanctions
imposed in 1995 did not subject foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to the person-based
controls under the Iran sanctions, OFAC imposed this reporting requirement in an effort to
prevent U.S.-based oil companies from circumventing the sanctions by channeling Iran business
through their foreign affiliates. The recent amendment to the regulation "eliminates Iranian-
origin petrochemicals from the definition of'reportable transactions' and terminates the reporting
requirements for subsidiaries' sales of [oilfield] services and goods."' " Certain transactions must
still be reported, however, including those involving crude oil and natural gas."
b. Waiver of ILSA Sanctions
In an effort to head off criticism from the European Union (and a possible challenge at the
World Trade Organization), the Clinton Administration declined to impose sanctions under
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). Enacted in 1996, ILSA mandates the imposition of
sanctions against any person-including foreign individuals or companies-that, among other
things, invest in the petroleum sector in Iran or Libya.' 4 Citing the statutory authority to waive
sanctions in the name of the national interest, Secretary of State Albright announced in May
1998 that the Administration would not pursue sanctions against Total S.A. of France, Gazprom
of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia in an agreement worth over 52 billion." Secretary Albright
asserted that the waiver would enhance cooperation with the EU and Russia on "inhibiting
Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism."" Perhaps
more importantly, the waiver of sanctions helped ease U.S.-EU tensions over unilateral sanctions
and thus averted, at least for the time being, an EU case against the United States at the WTO.
Many in Congress criticized the Administration for the waiver, including Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott, Banking Chairman Alfonse D'Amato, Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse
Helms, and House International Relations Chairman Benjamin Gilman. Efforts to amend lISA
to eliminate the waiver provision, however, failed.'
7
31. 60 Fed. Reg. 47,061 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 560).
32. 63 Fed. Reg. 62,940 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 560).
33. 63 Fed. Reg. 62,941 (1998).
34. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541.
35. See Secretary Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in
the South Pars Case (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://Secretary.State.gov/www/statements/1998/980518.html>.
36. Id.
37. See Gilman Amnouncs Inente to Remove US. Abilky to Waive ILSA Sanaiom, 16 IamaE U.S. TRADE, June
5, 1998, at 1.
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c. Additional Missile Sanctions Averted
On June 23, the President vetoed a new sanctions bill, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions
Act of 1998."' This legislation would have required imposition of sanctions against foreign
individuals and companies if there was "credible information" indicating that such entities
assisted Iran's missile program, or attempted more than once to provide such assistance. The
sanctions included a prohibition on the sale of defense articles and services; exports of certain
dual-use items; and U.S. government assistance. In vetoing the bill, the President argued that
the legislation was "indiscriminate, inflexible, and prejudicial to [nonproliferation] efforts, and
would in fact undermine the national security objectives of the United States." At the same
time, the Administration, acting on its own initiative, imposed sanctions against several Russian
entities alleged to have assisted Iran in its nudear/missile program. 3' These steps were viewed
widely as an effort to forestall additional legislative sanctions.
d. August 1997 Executive Order Awaiting Regulatory Implementation
One non-development in 1998 with respect to U.S. sanctions policy towards Iran is worthy
of note. OFAC failed to issue long-awaited regulations implementing an August 1997 executive
order that modified, in a number of respects, the scope of the Iran embargo. On August 19,
1997, after almost two years of official silence with respect to the Iran sanctions, President
Clinton issued an executive order that superseded the May 1995 Order.40 Although the 1997
order stated that it was to "clarify the steps taken" in the previous executive order, it modified
the scope of several provisions in the original sanctions.4' The 1997 order, still awaiting regulatory
implementation, appears to reflect the U.S. Government's emerging view that U.S. persons
should be barred from playing any role in a broader range of third-country transactions involving
Iran.
6. Iraq
In November, consistent with U.N. efforts to encourage Iraq to pursue the "oil-for-food"
program, OFAC amended its regulations to permit U.S. companies to enter into executory
contracts for the sale of oilfield parts and equipment to the Government of Iraq.42 Issued on
February 20, 1998, UNSCR No. 11 53 authorizes the Government of Iraq to produce and
export S 5.26 billion in petroleum and petroleum products every six months to fund humanitarian
efforts in Iraq. To enable Iraq to achieve the level of exports authorized in UNSCR No. 11 5 3,
the U.N. Security Council issued UNSCR No. 1175, which permits exportation to Iraq of
certain oilfield parts and equipment. Consistent with these resolutions, on November 10, 1998,
OFAC issued a general license amending the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. pt. S75)
38. See Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998: Veto Message From the President of the United
States, 144 CONG. Rac. H5071-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1998).
39. See id.
40. See Executive Order No. 13,059, 3 C.F.R. 217, 220, § 7 (1997).
41. Among other things, the 1997 Executive Order includes a more explicit and expansive definition of
prohibited exports of services. The 1997 Executive Order also prohibits, for the first time, reexports of services
to Iran. The previous Executive Order, as well as OFAC's implementing regulations, barred transactions by U.S.
persons relating to goods or technology of Iranian-origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran;
but U.S. persons were not explicitly prohibited from engaging or participating in otherwise permitted reexport
activities. Another departure of the 1997 Order from the original Executive Order is in its new and expanded
articulation of the prohibition on facilitation or approval of certain third country transactions.
42. See 63 Fed. Reg. 62,942 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 575).
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to permit U.S. persons to enter into executory contracts for the sale of oilfidd parts and
equipment to the Government of Iraq in conformity with United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) Nos. 1153 and 1175. 41
On its face, section 575.522(aX4) authorizes U.S. companies to enter into executory contracts
for the supply of oilfield parts to the Government of Iraq without a license, provided that
performance of the contract is expressly conditioned upon OFAC approval. OFAC officials
have confirmed that a U.S. person is not required to file a license application with OFAC prior
to being awarded a contract by Iraq. Nonetheless, several limitations still apply to executory
contracts with Iraq. First, the entry into executory contracts pursuant to section 575.522(a),
induding all related financing, insurance, transportation, delivery, and other incidental contracts,
must be consistent with UNSCR No. 986 (which established the "oil-for-food" program), all
other relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and any applicable guidance from the U.N.
Iraq Sanctions Committee." Second, contract performance must be contingent upon the prior
approval of other U.S. Government agencies, if such contracts involve the exportation, reexporta-
tion, transfer, or supply of any goods, technology, or services that are subject to license require-
ments of another U.S. Government agency.4' Third, this general license does not authorize
U.S. persons to travel to Iraq to negotiate such executory contracts.
6
III. Other Sanctions Initiatives
Despite calls for limiting or scaling back unilateral sanctions, the United States introduced
a number of new and rather innovative sanctions programs in 1998. This section describes
these new measures, which could trigger the imposition of sanctions for a host of new reasons.
A. INTMNATIONAL RELIGIoUs FRErDoM Acr
In the final days of the 1998 session, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998.4' As its name suggests, this new law seeks to curb religious persecution overseas
by directing the President to impose sanctions against countries that flagrantly violate individuals'
religious freedom. The legislation passed the Senate on October 9, 1998, "' and the House one
day later.49 The President signed it into law on October 27, 1998.50 The final legislation differed
substantially from the original version of the bill, the Freedom From Religious Persecution
Act, which had passed the House on May 14, 1998.5 The enacted bill represented a compromise
between conservative supporters of the tough sanctions legislation and opponents of unilateral
sanctions, induding the administration. 2 Among the most significant compromises was a change
43. See 31 C.F.R. § 575.522(a(4) (1998).
44. See id § 575.522(cXl) (1998).
45. See id § 575.522(cX2) (1998).
46. See id. § 575.522(d) (1998).
47. See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Star. 2787.
48. See 144 CoNG. REc. S12091, S12099-05 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (98-0 vote).
49. Se 144 CONG. Rac. H10434-O1 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (under suspension of the rules).
50. Statement by the President (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.pub.whithouse.gov/uri-res/12Rum:
pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1998/10/28/7.tex.1 >.
51. 144 CONG. REc. H3263-03, H3293 (daily ed. May 14, 1998).
52. Se Regiou Sanaiom Bill Gaim Passage, Admisraton Support, 16 INSME U.S. TRaDE, Oct. 16, 1998,
at 12. House conservatives complained that the Senate bill "stretche[d] flexibility almost to the breaking point."
Miles A. Pomper, House Pase; Bi/t Combat Persecution, 56 CONG. Q. WKLY., Oct. 17, 1998, at 2835 (quoting
Rep. Christopher H. Smith).
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in the presidential waiver authority: the original bill gave the President very limited waiver
authority, while the bill that became law permits him to waive sanctions if the imposition of
sanctions would interfere with an "important national interest.""
As enacted, the International Religious Freedom Act requires the President to take certain
actions against governments that violate the religious freedom of its citizens. It establishes two
categories of violating governments: (1) one that "engages in or tolerates violations of religious
freedom;"' 4 and (2) those that "engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious
freedom."" "Particularly severe" violations are defined as "systematic, ongoing, egregious
violations of religious freedom," such as torture, enforced and arbitrary disappearances, or
arbitrary prolonged detention.'
For the first category of countries-the less severe violators-the President must take one
or more of a series of fifteen actions." These steps include: making a private or public demarche
(diplomatic protest); condemning the practice in public; delaying scientific or cultural exchanges;
delaying official travel; or imposing economic sanctions." Alternatively, the President may
enter into a binding agreement with that country which obligates that government to take
steps to end religious persecution.'
9
For the second category of countries-the severe violators-the President must impose one
or more of the following measures: end development assistance; ban Export-Import Bank,
OPIC, or Trade and Development Agency loans or activities; cease security assistance; oppose
all loans at international financial institutions, such as the World Bank; ban the issuance of
export licenses for goods or technologies to the government, agency, instrumentality, or official
responsible for the violation; prohibit U.S. bank loans of more than 510 million to that govern-
ment; or prohibit U.S. government procurement of goods or services from the violating foreign
government.60 The President may waive the sanctions if he finds that the government has ceased
violations, finds waiving the sanctions would further the purposes of the Act, or determines that
an "important national interest of the United States" requires waiver of the sanctions.61 Again,
the President may instead enter into a binding agreement to end religious persecution. 2
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Although it is not designed as sanctions legislation, the new statute implementing U.S.
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention includes a number of potentially far-
reaching sanctions provisions. In the final days of the 1998 legislative session, Congress passed
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (the Act).63 The Senate gave
its advice and consent to the underlying treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),"
53. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 407, 112 Star. 2787, 2808.
54. Id. § 401.
55. Id. § 402 (emphasis added).
56. Id § 3(11).
57. Id § 401(bXl), at 2801.
58. Id. § 405(a), at 2806-2807.
59. Id § 405(c), at 2807.
60. Id. § 405.
61. Id. § 407.
62. Id. § 402(cX2), at 2803.
63. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(most portions of this act will be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6771).
64. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) [hereinafter Convention].
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in April 1997," but the implementing legislation had become bogged down in partisan wrangling
and an unrelated battle over a bill to impose sanctions on Russia for exports of missile technology
to Iran."
1. Imspecem Regime
The CWC is one of the most ambitious arms control treaties in history. It outlaws the
development, use, or stockpiling of chemical weapons and establishes a new international agency,
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to conduct inspections
and collect data to verify, compliance. As a signatory state, the United States and its chemical
facilities-induding private facilities-are subject to inspection, particularly sites where the most
dangerous categories of listed chemicals are produced, processed, or consumed. As such, it is
the first arms control treaty to widely affect the private sector.
The U.S. implementing legislation establishes a legal framework for implementing U.S.
commitments under the CWC. It designates the Department of State as the "National Author-
ity" for the international inspection regime, and provides authority for the conduct of inspec-
tions.67 The Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration will be responsible for
issuing implementing regulations, which should provide further details on the inspection and
reporting requirements. Although no U.S. facility makes chemical weapons, many chemicals
that could be used to make chemical weapons-so called "dual-use" or "precursor" chemicals-
are produced by U.S. companies. The CWC "lists" these dual-use chemicals and provides for
monitoring of their production and sale.6 Consistent with the terms of the treaty, the implement-
ing legislation also prohibits the development, production, acquiring, transfer, receipt, stockpil-
ing, retaining, owning, possessing, or threatening to use, any chemical weapons or assisting,
attempting, or conspiring to do any of the above. 9 The legislation establishes severe criminal
penalties for violating these prohibitions.7"
2. New Basis for Sanaions
Because the CWC permits international inspectors from the OPCW to monitor and inspect
the facilities of U.S. companies, some in Congress and the private sector expressed concern
about the potential loss of proprietary or confidential business information arising from the
inspections." The inspection teams will likely indude individuals from countries whose compa-
nies (or governments) compete with the U.S. chemical industry and the fear is that these
individuals may steal proprietary information under the guise of the CWC inspection regime.
To protect against the loss of such information, the implementing legislation establishes a
65. 143 CONG. Rac. S3568 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
66. The CWC implementing legislation was included in the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998,
which was vetoed by the President on June 24, 1998. H.R. Doc. No. 105-276, 144 CONG. REc. H5071 (daily
ed. June 24, 1998).
67. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277 § 101, 112 Stat.
2681.
68. The Convention establishes three "schedules" of chemical agents according to the risk that they pose.
See Convention, supra note 64, at 821.
69. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act § 229.
70. Id The Act establishes criminal penalties, including imposition of the death penalty, if the violation results
in the "death of another person." . § 229A. It also imposes civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation
and revocation of export privileges. Id.
71. See CLemnical Weapom Implemntation Legislation: Hearing on S. 610Before the Senate Comm. On tbeJudiciary,
105th Cong. 552 (1997).
SUMMER 1999
268 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
complex set of protections which indude a new basis for imposing sanctions. Most notably,
the legislation permits U.S. persons to bring a legal daim against the U.S. government for a
"taking of property without just compensation" or for any tort arising because of the CWC
inspections." Loss of proprietary information would be construed as both a taking and a tort
and thus actionable under the new legislation. The Act also authorizes civil actions by U.S.
nationals against any foreign national or company for the "unauthorized or unlawful acquisition,
receipt, transmission, or use of property" as a result of CWC inspections." (In many cases,
however, U.S. courts may not have jurisdiction over these nationals or companies.)
In addition, the implementing legislation imposes a visa ban on any foreign person who (1)
works or worked for the OPCW and revealed confidential business information, (2) "traffics"
in U.S. confidential business information, (3) is a corporate officer, principal, or controlling
shareholder in any company which "has been involved in the unauthorized disdosure of United
States confidential business information," or (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of an exdudable
person.74 These provisions are similar to entry restrictions set forth in Tide IV of the highly-
controversial Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, commonly
known as "Hdms-Burton.'
If the U.S. government is hdd liable for the theft of proprietary information, it must in
turn impose sanctions against (1) any member of the OPCW inspection team which stole the
information, or (2) any foreign person, company, or foreign government which "knowingly
assisted, encouraged or induced, in any way, a foreign person" in the theft of such information."
The sanctions are mandatory and shall be imposed for not less than ten years for companies
and five years for foreign governments. Sanctions may be waived by the President, however,
if he determines that such waiver is "necessary to protect the national security interests of
the United States."" In addition, the President is authorized to suspend the sanctions upon
recoupment for the amount for which the U.S. government was hdd liable.78 For a foreign
company, the sanctions include: a ban on arms exports, a prohibition on the export of any
controlled goods or technologies, a ban on any loan or assistance by international financial
institutions, a prohibition on Export-Import Bank transactions, a prohibition on all private
bank transactions, the blocking of assets, and a denial of landing rights." The sanctions against
a foreign government include the same sanctions as above plus termination of U.S. government
assistance. °
C. NAico-T oIsr CoNTRoLs
The Office of Foreign Assets Control continued its practice of designating certain terrorists
and narcotics traffickers as "Specially Designated Terrorists," "Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions," and "Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers" (SDNTs) subject to U.S. sanctions.
72. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act § 103(a)-(b). Before bringing suit, the person must
give the U.S. Government one-year notice during which it can seek remedies from the person or the OPCW.
Id. § 103(aX2). The Act waives sovereign immunity for these causes of action. Id. § 103(c).
73. Id. § 103(d)(3, at 2681-862.
74. Id. § 103(0, at 2681-865.
75. 22 U.S.C.S. § 6091 (Supp. 11 1996).
76. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act § 103(eX2XA), (3XAXii).
77. Id. § 103(eX3).
78. Id. § 103(eX4).
79. Id. § 103(eX2).
80. Id. § 103(eX3).
VOL. 3 3, NO. 2
BUSINESS REGULATION 269
Such designation imposes a blocking order on any funds held by these individuals or organizations
in the United States. In late 1997, OFAC designated thirty additional terrorist organizations,
mostly from the Middle East, as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations."'" During 1998, OFAC
designated six more individuals and twenty-one entities as SDNTs because of their "significant
role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia." 2 This trend is likely to continue
in the future as U.S. policymakers struggle to address threats that do not stem from a particular
government.
D. Rio.M EFFoRTs?
Although sanctions continue to be the foreign policy tool of choice for both the Administration
and the Congress, both branches of government are at'least paying lip service to the need for
systematic reform of U.S. sanctions policy. The reform initiative began in 1997 with the
introduction of congressional legislation that would have required formal consultations between
the Administration, Congress, and industry prior to the imposition of any new sanctions
programs. Although no such law has been enacted, both the House and the Senate will likely
continue to consider ways to adopt a more disciplined approach to sanctions policies.
The Administration's own sanctions review gained momentum in the Spring of 1998 follow-
ing the imposition of statutorily-mandated sanctions against India and Pakistan in response to
their detonation of nudear devices. The Administration complained from the outset that the
rigid, mandatory nature of the sanctions impeded U.S. nonproliferation efforts by not allowing
flexibility and a means for easing the sanctions to reward concessions offered by the two
countries. At the same time, the President exercised his authority under the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act (ILSA) to waive possible sanctions against European oil companies that would have created
substantial diplomatic friction and a possible challenge at the World Trade Organization. While
controversial with ILSA's congressional supporters, the waiver generally was applauded by
foreign governments and industry interests. Most recently, the Administration has announced
plans to liberalize certain aspects of the long-standing embargo of Cuba.
Meanwhile, in a dassic "Jekyll and Hyde" scenario, both branches of government have
continued to implement new and expanded sanctions measures. The most prevalent example
in 1998 was the International Religious Freedom Act, which could lead to sanctions against
countries determined by the State Department to flagrantly violate individual religious freedom.
Despite a waiver provision, the broad menu of sanctions and their potential application to
important U.S. trading partners (induding China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia) could create addi-
tional friction in 1999.
While key members of Congress and U.S. industry have labeled sanctions reform as a top
priority for 1999, there is no sign yet that the reform debate has slowed the rate at which the
U.S. government makes sanctions of various types a primary tool of its foreign policy. Indeed,
states and municipalities have continued to expand their own use of sanctions, even in the face
of a federal district court ruling that a Massachusetts law targeting entities that trade with
Burma was invalid on constitutional grounds. Absent a fundamental shift in the political landscape
that makes sanctions an easy if not effective option, the obstacles to genuine sanctions reform
are likely to remain in 1999 and the years to come.
81. 62 Fed. Reg. 67,729 (1997) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. ch. V).
82. 63 Fed. Reg. 28,896 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. ch. V).
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1. State and Local Sanctions
Despite increasing concerns about their constitutionality, state and local governments across
the United States have continued to enact sanctions measures against various foreign govern-
ments and companies that do business in targeted countries. Typically based on human rights
concerns, state and local sanctions measures generally consist of selective purchasing, contracting,
or investment measures." Currently, twenty-five state and local governments have sanctions
laws in effect, including twenty-three directed against Burma, five against Nigeria, and one
against Cuba, Indonesia, Switzerland, and Tibet (China). At least four cities imposed new
sanctions in 1998: Los Angeles (Switzerland, July 1998); Portland (Burma, July 1998); Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, (Burma, June 1998 and Indonesia, Aug. 1999); and Somerville, Massa-
chusetts (Burma, February 199 8)."
While state and local governments continued to impose sanctions in 1998, the National
Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) initiated an aggressive legal campaign to put an end to these
measures. In April 1998, the NFTC filed a lawsuit 6 challenging the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts law prohibiting the state government from purchasing goods or services from
any company doing business with the Government of Burma." In November, Judge Nauro of
the federal District Court in Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional
because it "impinges on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign af-
fairs."" The State of Massachusetts announced on November 10, 1998, that it will appeal
the district court decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.8" A Circuit Court decision is
expected in 1999.
Looming over the NFTC lawsuit is a European Union threat to call for a dispute panel at
the World Trade Organization challenging the legality of the Massachusetts law under WTO
principles. The European Union's head of delegation, Hugo Paemen, sent a letter to Under
Secretary Stuart Eizenstat in March 1998 warning of WTO action unless there is a "satisfactory
outcome of th[e] matter."' 0 At this point, the European Union appears content to wait for
83. U.S. Intemational Trade Commission, Overview andAnalysofCurntm US. UnilaeralEoomicSaaiom,
Pub. No. 3124, Investigation No. 332-391, at 2-18 (Aug. 1998).
84. Se Organization for Intemational Investment (OFII) (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.ofii/org/issues/
sanction.htm1> (current list of state and local sanctions); see a/so USA*ENGAGE, States and Municipalities
with Proposed or Enacted Sanctions Laws (visited Feb. 2 3, 1999) < http://usaengage/org/resources/map3 .html >
(sanctions map).
85. NFTC is a broadly based trade association which deals exdusively with U.S. public policy affecting
international trade and investment. Its membership consists of more than 550 U.S. manufacturing corporations,
financial institutions, and other U.S. firms having substantial international operations or interests.
86. See Complaint For Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief, National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker
(visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://usaengage.org/background/lawsuit/complain.htnd>; see also Michael S. Lelyveld,
Industry group takes Mattacbsurt to cun ofer Myamar sanction, J. OF COM., May 1, 1998, at 3A. Burma has
been renamed Myanmar by the current regime, but many observers continue to use the former name.
87. Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (Supp. 1998). The law allows procurement from companies on
the "restricted purchase list" only if the procurement is "essential," the purchase is medical supplies, or there is
no comparable low bid. Id. § 22H(b).
88. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) (order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Memorandum & Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend the Complaint).
89. See Mauadusa to Appeal Court Dcion on Burma Sanations Law, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 1998,
at 13.
90. EU Tbreatem WTO Paml Witbout Quick End to State Sansiom Figt 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 20,
1998, at 1, 18.
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the final outcome of the Massachusetts suit, but further WTO action against state or local
sanctions remains a possibility."'
2. Frktion with Trading Partners
Throughout 1998, the European Union and United States sparred over the extraterritorial
reach of various U.S. sanctions measures. Two laws, both enacted in 1996, have been the
target of intense diplomatic criticism, blocking legislation, and the threat of a WTO challenge:
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA)92 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (also know as Hdms-Burton). 3 It is the broad extraterritorial
reach of these laws, which some commentators believe exceed international law norms, that
have been at the heart of the controversy.'
Since the passage of the Helms-Burton legislation in 1996, the Clinton administration has
been attempting to broker an agreement to avert an EU challenge to these laws at the World
Trade Organization." With the goal of avoiding a WTO challenge, Under Secretary Eizenstat
reached an agreement with the European Union in May 1998.96 Under the terms of the
agreement, the United States agreed to waive sanctions against the companies engaged in the
Iranian pipeline transactions, to continue the waiver of private suits under Tide III of the
Helms-Burton Act, and to seek waiver authority under Title IV of the Act. Tide IV imposes
a mandatory denial of visas to individuals who "traffic" in confiscated property. In return,
the European Union agreed to a series of "disciplines" that ban investment in any illegally
expropriated property in the future and set up a claims registry on which claimants who contend
that their property has been expropriated can file a claim. The EU also agreed to forestall any
INTO action. As of the end of 1998, however, the agreement remained precarious and had
yet to be implemented. Congress has not acted on the necessary amendment to Tide IV of
Helms-Burton and there is continuing disagreement on the interpretation of the EU disciplines
agreement."
IV. Export Policy Developments
Apart from the sanctions initiatives discussed above, both Congress and the Administration
continued to address important policy questions under U.S. export control laws. Largely a
relic of the Cold War, during which the United States and its COCOM partners sought to
limit the flow of militarily useful goods and technology from the West to the Soviet block,
U.S. export control laws face new challenges as we approach the twenty-first century. To name
9 1. The European Union filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the NFTC. For a copy of the brief, see
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff National Foreign Trade Council, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v.
Baker (No. 98-CV-10757 ( T)) (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://usaengage.orgesources/nftcbrief.html>.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. [ 1996).
93. 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 6021-91 (Supp. 11 1996).
94. See American Bar Association, Section of International Law and Practice, Recommendation and Report, (Nov.
1998) (urging the U.S. Government to refrain from adopting or maintaining extraterritorial foreign trade controls).
95. The EU requested the formation of a panel to consider the compatibility of Helms-Burton with WTO
commitments, but suspended proceedings to allow bilateral negotiations to proceed. See Dan Balz, US. Ease
Stand on Cuba, Iran Sanctions: Helms Candemus, Europe Hails Move, FuN. Tmss, May 19, 1998, at AIY.
96. See Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for Strengthening of Investment Protection (visited Feb.
4, 1999) <http://presid.fco.gov.uk/news/1998/May/18/invest.txt>.
97. See, e.g., Gilman Renews Effort to Conhide US.-EU Talks on He/ms-Burton, 17 INSmE U.S. TRAnE, Jan.
22, 1999, at 1, 20.
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a few, these include: How to address the threat posed by non-conventional weapons of mass
destruction, which are becoming easier to develop and deploy? How to deal with international
terrorism that often defies national boundaries and is not tied to any particular government?
How to administer and enforce controls over transfers of new and emerging technologies,
particularly where transfers-or "exports"-of technology can now be accomplished electroni-
cally and securely with the stroke of a computer key? How to balance national security and
human rights concerns with respect to nations like China against new global business realities?
The policy debate in 1998 was a direct reflection of these issues.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF WASSENAAR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
To fulfill U.S. obligations under the so-called "Wassenaar Arrangement," the successor
regime to COCOM, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
revised its Export Administration Regulations on January 15, 1998.98 Unlike COCOM, the
Wassenaar Arrangement does not target specific countries of concern, and it does not have the
power to block the transfer of sensitive items to particular destinations. Instead, the thirty-three
signatories to Wassenaar have agreed to increase transparency in transfers of conventional arms
and related dual-use goods and technology by preparing biannual reports that detail all exports
of these items to countries that are not signatories to the Arrangement.
The EAR revisions imposed two new obligations on U.S. exporters. First, it forced them
to reexamine and adjust the Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) assigned to their
products and technology and confirm that license exceptions for exports of those items are
still available. In order to bring U.S. export controls into line with those of other Wassenaar
countries, BXA decontrolled and reclassified goods and technology in most categories of the
Commerce Control List (CCL) and removed the availability of license exceptions for certain
items that the Wassenaar signatories considered most critical to military applications.
Second, U.S. exporters are now required to submit biannual reports to BXA if they are
shipping certain Wassenaar-controlled items."' The United States is required to prepare a report
that details all exports of commodities, software, and technology that are controlled under
certain ECCNs. BXA will compile statistics for exports of these reportable goods and technology
from license applications and certain other official submissions that it receives from exporters.
Since BXA is not able to track shipments made under license exceptions, however, U.S. exporters
must compile and submit a report of all exports (but not reexports) of reportable commodities
that were shipped to non-signatory countries under any of the following license exceptions:
GBS, CIV, TSR, LVS, CTP, and GOV. °°
Within the multilateral framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the United States is
continuing to work with its trading partners to develop common controls on exports of sensitive
goods and technology.
B. LiBERALmZED ENCRYPTION EXPORT POLICY
As a conservative wave washed over many aspects of the United States' export control policy
in 1998, the Clinton administration surprisingly announced dramatic liberalizations to its export
policy for encryption hardware and software. On December 31, 1998, the Commerce Depart-
98. 63 Fed. Reg. 2452 (1998) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 740, 742, 743, 744, 746, 762 and
774).
99. Id. at 2458 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. 743.1).
100. Id
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ment amended its Export Administration Regulations to allow exports of stronger encryption
products to an expanding universe of countries and end-users.'°' The new regulations introduce
a new License Exception "ENC," under which approved encryption products may be exported
without an export license. Eligibility for export under License Exception ENC is based either
on the strength of the algorithm or the nature of the entity to which the product is being
shipped.
Under the product-based approach, items limited to a 56-bit DES or equivalent algorithm
may-subject to a one-time technical review by the Commerce Department-be exported to
all non-terrorist countries. Products that have already received a technical review (through a
license or classification ruling) are immediately eligible for export under License Exception
ENC. Where a product has not been reviewed, or where there is a change in algorithm or
key-length to a previously approved item, some form of approval by the Commerce Department
is required prior to export under License Exception ENC.
The customer-based version of License Exception ENC can be used for products that go
far beyond the 56-bit technical limitation described above. Again subject to a one-time technical
review, the new regulation allows very robust encryption products to be exported to foreign
subsidiaries and branches of U.S. companies on virtually a worldwide basis. In addition, the
new rule permits exports under License Exception ENC of limited purpose strong encryption
products to financial institutions, insurance agencies, health and medical companies, and on-line
merchants in forty-five specified countries. Although the new regulation defines each of the
eligible sectors broadly, exports to them are restricted for use in inter/intra-company transactions,
transactions between the company and its clients, or protection of proprietary information and
medical records. No customer-to-customer communications or transactions are authorized.
C. CONGRESSIONAL RoLLBAcK?
In highly-publicized challenges to the Clinton Administration's export control policies, particu-
larly with respect to China, the U.S. Congress is calling into question several long-standing
assumptions about the appropriate direction of U.S. export controls. With the end of the Cold
War and the accompanying demise of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s, the United States
and its former COCOM allies removed national security export controls on hundreds of products
and related technologies. The basis for this dramatic liberalization of multilateral export controls
was the assumption that traditional military threats to the West had dissipated and that the
world trading system was entering a new era of global cooperation and integration.
In recent months, however, this trend has become subject to political criticism, legislative
action, and extremely negative portrayals in the press. Citing high-profile accounts of sensitive
technology transfers to China and other "countries of concern," many members of Congress-
on both sides of the aisle-are calling for more stringent export licensing requirements and
more aggressive enforcement by administrative authorities. Perhaps the most concrete evidence
of this shift in policy is a recent classified House Intelligence Committee Report that is reportedly
highly critical of U.S. export policies and practices with respect to China over the past twenty
years.
These calls for export "recontrols," often fueled by disgruntled Defense Department officials
opposed to liberalization efforts, 2 have led to expanded unilateral export controls on high
101. 63 Fed. Reg. 72,156 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 742, 743, 772, and 774).
102. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Beijing Expot Bauk, WAll ST. J., Nov. 27, 1998, at A12.
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computers and commercial satellites. If this trend continues in 1999, U.S. exporters could face
a dramatic return to unilateralism and competitive pressures in the international marketplace
that multilateral regimes are designed to guard against.
1. Higb-sped computen
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (NDAA) required the Depart-
ment of Commerce to conduct post-shipment verifications of all shipments of high performance
computers to sensitive countries.1"' This new inspection requirement was imposed because of
Congressional concerns about possible diversions of high-speed computers to end-users of con-
cern in Russia, China, and other potential adversaries or entities engaged in the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. The law was opposed by the Clinton Administration (and
the Commerce Department in particular), on the premise that the verification requirements
amounted to unilateral controls that went beyond those set within the context of the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
2. Satellite Tedmology
In response to growing concern about the spread of sensitive technology and the allegations
of illegal transfers to the People's Republic of China, Congress shifted control over the licensing
of commercial satellites from the Commerce Department to the State Department. "Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, all satellites and related items that are on the Commerce
Control List of dual-use items in the Export Administration Regulation (15 CFR pt. 730 et
seq.) on the date of the enactment of this Act shall be transferred to the United States Munitions
List and controlled under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2 7 78)." 104
The effective date of the jurisdiction transfer will be March 15, 1999.
3. Otber "Recontrols"?
Additional recontrols loom on the horizon for 1999. On December 31, 1998, a House
special committee on high-technology trade with China, the so-called "Cox Committee,"''
completed work on a classified report. The Cox Committee charged that exports to China
had harmed U.S. national security, and made thirty-eight specific recommendations to prevent
further problems. While many of the details of the report remain classified, it apparently calls
for tighter controls on exports of supercomputers, greater security at U.S. nuclear weapons
labs, and stricter monitoring of foreign investment in defense-related industries.'" Congressional
action on these recommendations is a strong possibility in the coming year.
V. Conclusions
In 1998, we saw evidence that there is a continuing, if not growing, propensity in the
United States to use sanctions measures and export controls as instruments of foreign policy.
103. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-8s, § 1213, 111 Stat.
1629 (1997).
104. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 1513(a), 112
Stat. 2174 (1998).
105. See 144 CONG. REc. H4748 (daily ed. June 18, 1998) (creating Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China). The Committee was chaired
by Congressman Chris Cox (R-CA).
106. David S. Cloud & Carla Anne Robbins, Report by House Pantel on Cbina Trade Backs Curbs on Supercomputer
E.pors, Wm.L ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999, at A6.
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Notwithstanding calls for reform and retrenchment, unilateral sanctions continue to flourish,
both at the federal and state and local levels. Many of the these measures include aggressive
extraterritorial features, which continue to irritate our trading partners and threaten to become
the target of a legal challenge at the World Trade Organization. Meanwhile, in the absence
of a strong statutory or multilateral framework, export controls are increasingly stirring up old
Cold War themes and tendencies to impose unilateral export restrictions.
Apart from these policy shifts, U.S. sanctions and export control laws continue to raise
various "rule of law" issues. At the macro level, the dassic struggles between the legislative
and executive branches, and between federal and state controls, add a degree of uncertainty
for U.S. (and foreign) businesses and introduce certain constitutional questions. At a more
fundamental level, regulatory implementation that is delayed, non-transparent, or internally
inconsistent often creates additional compliance hurdles and a chilling effect that goes beyond
the scope of the targeted activities. In this vein, the government's growing reliance on web
sites and other unofficial publications to give policy guidance; the lack of transparency regarding
agency interpretations, licensing policies, and enforcement actions; and the absence of judicial
review under most legislative and regulatory programs make it more difficult for affected
businesses and the private bar to achieve reform.
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